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Purpose of this work is to find, describe and test existing tools and features 
available in linux-based solution for filtering malicious traffic. As source of 
malicious traffic taken most widly-used Ddos attacks targeting Web servers. SYN, 
UDP and ICMP Flood attacks are described and different variants of they 
mitigation are explained. Available tools for manipulating with traffic, like ebtables  
and iptables tools are compared, based on each type of attack. Specially created 
experimental network was used for testing purposes, configured filters servers 
and bridge. Inspected packets flow through linux kernel network stack along with 
tuning options serving for increasing filter server traffic throughput. As a result, 
ebtables tool appears to be most productive, due to less resources it needed to 
process each packet (frame). Pointed out that separate detecting system is needed 
for this tool, in order to provide further filtering methods with data. As main 
conclusion, linux-based solutions provide full functionality for filtering traffic 
either in stand-alone state or combined with detecting systems. 
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V této práci jsou zkoumaní základní principy odporů servisních útoků, 
nejběžnějších typů a účelu použití. Popsané dostupné techniky zmírnění různých 
typu útoků, nástrojů a přístupů v operačních systémech postavených na Linuxu. 
Nakonfigurován filtrcni server a pro účely testování simulovan SYN Flood, UDP 
Flood a ICMP Flood útoky. Bylo zjištěno, vhodne techniky vyrovnání tehto  druhu  
útoku a realizováné  příslušna konfigurace filtrování. 
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According to Akamai State of the Internet / Security Report the frequency of ddos 
attacks has increased by 71% worldwide in 2016. Along with recent event, 
involving WannaCrypt malicious software spreading, security and protection 
questions for internet users, becoming more important than ever before. Purpose 
of this diploma work to find out and test most efficient and reliable tools existing in 
Linux based systems for filtering and aggregation ddos attacks. Linux based 
solutions are considered as chip and easy to configured systems among available 
competitor. Most common Web servers focused ddos attacks will be taken into 
consideration such as SYN/UDP Flood and ICMP Flood. By configuring filter 
servers and applying suitable setup, most efficient and reliable solution will be 
chosen. Aggregation of traffic will be considered from a point of impact on filtering 
productivity. 
Master thesis consist of three parts. Ddos attacks overview, most common 
types and methods of mitigations, available Linux based solutions for traffic 
filtering and aggregation will be represented in part 1. Next part will describe 
experimental network components and kernel tuning. Last part will include 





1.1 DDOS. MITIGATION METHODS. 
A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack [1] is malicious attempt to make 
an online service unavailable to users, usually by temporarily interrupting or 
suspending the services of its hosting server. Originally based on target service 
resources limitation, ddos attacks can be done by either spoofing attacker ip 
address or using so called 'botnet'. Botnet is a network of hacked devices, 
connected to global network which control is gained by third party. Compromise 
devices can send traffic to a target services which makes ddos mitigation complex, 
as it's hard to distinguish legitimate traffic from malicious. 
According to 2016–2017 Global Application & Network Security Report by 
Radware [2], most wildly used types of attack in 2016 were SYN Flood, UDP and 
ICMP Flood.  
 
1.1.1 UDP Flood  
 
 User datagram Protocol (UDP) is a connectionless networking protocol, 
providing checksums for data integrity and port numbers for addressing functions 
[1].  In the absence of an initial handshake, to establish a valid connection, there is 
no guarantee of data delivery, ordering or duplicate protection. Thus high volume 
of “best effort” traffic can be sent over UDP channels to any host, with no built-in 
protection to limit the rate of the UDP DDoS flood. This means that not only are 
UDP flood attacks highly-effective, but also that they could be executed with a help 
of relatively few resources. 
In UDP Flood attack attacker sends large number of UDP packets to a victim 
system, which leads to network saturation and the depletion of available 
bandwidth for legitimate service requests to the victim system [1].  When the 
victim system receives a UDP packet, it will determine what application is waiting 
on the destination port. When server determines that there is no application 
listening on the port, it will generate an ICMP packet of “destination unreachable” 
to the forged source address. If enough UDP packets are delivered to ports of the 
victim, system will go down.  
Another way to perform an attack is to send huge amount of UDP packet on 
certain (opened) ports, leading to link bandwidth exhaustion.  
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Among known option of mitigating is to close all unused port on server and 
filter all incoming traffic destined to target server, except DNS. 
 
1.1.2 SYN Flood  
 
       SYN Flood attack aiming on TCP three-way handshake mechanism, by sending 
connection requests faster than target machine can process them, causing network 
saturation [1]. Under normal conditions clients system begins by sending a SYN 
message to the server. The server then acknowledges the SYN message by sending 
SYN-ACK message to the client. The client then finishes establishing the connection 
by responding with an ACK message. The connection between the client and the 
server is then open, and the service-specific data can be exchanged between the 




Figure 1.1    Three-way handshake mechanism 
 
The potential weak point is where the server system has sent an 
acknowledgment (SYN-ACK) back to client but has not yet received the ACK 
message. This is known as half-open connection.  
The server has built in its system memory a data structure (SYN queue) 
describing all pending connections [3]. This data structure is of limit size, and it 
can be overflowed by intentionally creating too many partially-open connections. 
Creating half-open connections is easily accomplished with IP spoofing. The 
attacking system sends SYN messages to the victim server system; these appear to 
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be legitimate but in fact reference a client system that is unable to respond to the 
SYN-ACK messages. This means that the final ACK message will never be sent to 
the victim server system, as shown in Fig.1.2: 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Principle of SYN Flood attack  
 
Among possible solutions for mitigation this kind of attacks are using 
firewalls with SYN cookie feature enabled, filtering by limitation of possible SYN 
packets per second passing accepted by server and blocking attacker source IP 
addresses. 
SYN cookies is technique how initial TCP sequence numbers will be chosen 
by TCP servers, developed for mitigating SYN flood attacks[3].  Basic differences in 
initial sequence number created by server and client are [4]: 
 Top 5 bits: t mod 32, where t is a 32-bit time counter that increases 
every 64 seconds; 
 Next 3 bits: an encoding of an MSS selected by the server in response 
to the client’s MSS; 
 Bottom 24 bits: a server-selected secret function of the client IP 
address and port number, the server IP address and port number, 
and t. 
Thus server which uses SYN cookies doesn’t have to drop connections when 
its SYN queue is filled.  It will send back a SYN+ACK, exactly as if the SYN queue 
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was larger. When the server receives ACK, it checks that the secret function works 
for a recent value of t, and then rebuilds the SYN queue from the encoded MSS. 
Limitation can be done based on exact server statistics, including average 
traffic rate, connections per second during specific time.  
 
1.1.3 ICMP Flood  
 
Internet control message protocol (ICMP) is used by devices, includes router, 
to send operational information messages for maintaining networks, such as 
diagnostic or control purposes [4]. ICMP Flood attack can be performed in “ping of 
dead” way, by sending large volumes of ICMP_ECHO_ REQUEST messages to the 
victim, which force target server to reply and thus results in saturation of victim 
bandwidth network connection. During an ICMP flood attack the source IP address 
may be spoofed.  
Possible solutions for mitigations are limit size of ping requests as well as 
the rate at which they can be accepted and denying all Icmp_Echo_Requests from 




1.2 LINUX-BASED FIREWALL 
 
While deciding which best solution to choose for traffic filtering and ddos 
attacks mitigations, Linux kernel based products can become more preferable 
considering price tag and user friendly environment. There are a lot of tools and 
tuning options for working with traffic, on which we need to have a closer look.  
Linux distributions are operating systems made from software collection 
[5], based on Linux kernel and package management system. Linux kernel is a 
computer program and is the core of an operating system, with complete control 
over everything in the system.  
Base for all manipulating with network stack in linux kernel, is netfilter. To 
be able to apply suitable techniques for filtering traffic, it's crucial to know, how 
incoming and outgoing packet to linux network stack are being handled by 
netfilter. 
 
1.2.1 Netfilter. Packetflow 
 
Netfilter is a framework provided by the Linux kernel and represents a set 
of hooks inside it, to allow specific kernel modules to register callback functions 
with the kernel’s networking stack [5]. General packets flow path through 
netfilter’s hooks is shown on pic.1.3: 
  
Picture 1.3 Packets flow through netfilter 
Let’s have a closer look on most essential functions for our testing purposes: 
 Qdisc – scheduler and major building block in Linux traffic control process. It 
queues all packets based on appropriate queuing discipline and transmits 
packet as soon as it can. There are ingress (inbound traffic) and egress 
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(outbound traffic) qdiscs. The default queuing discipline for all interfaces under 
Linux is pfifo_fast. It based on a conventional FIFO qdisc and provides 
prioritization. There are three different bands for separating traffic. The 
highest priority traffic are placed into band 0 and are always serviced first.  
 Bridge check - simply check, if interface, from which packet was received, 
belongs to bridge or not. If so, frame will not be processed at this point and will 
be send to bridging decision function. 
 Conntrack - connection tracking subsystem. It stores information about the 
state of a connection, including source and destination IP addresses, port 
number pairs, protocol types, state, and timeout in structured memory [5]. 
 Bridging decision - at this point frame is being investigated whether it's 
destination is local process or its destination MAC address is located on 
another side of the bridge. It can do with frame 4 thing: 
1. Bridge it 
2. Flood it over, if the destination MAC address is unknown to the bridge. 
3. Pass it to the higher protocol code (IP code) 
4. Ignore it, if a destination MAC address is on the same side of the bridge. 
 Routing decision - based on IP address it decides if packet destination is local 
process or it should be forwarded. Packet will be send through bridge interface 
at this point, if forwarded. 
 
 
1.2.2 Ebtables  
 
 Linux kernel built-in filtering tool, since kernel version 2.2 [7], which 
allows to set up and maintain tables of rules that inspect Ethernet frames. It's 
similar to iptables tools but with less functions due to fact that Ethernet frame 
header is less complex than IP packet header. Ebtables rules are working only with 
bridged frames and compare to iptables , frame is processed earlier in the stack, 
consuming less resources. 
There are three tables named filter, nat and broute [7]. Syntax for managing 
with ebtables rules is the same as with iptables rules.  
 Filter is the default table and contains three built-in chains: INPUT (for frames 
destined for the bridge itself), OUTPUT (for locally-generated or (b)routed 
frames) and FORWARD (for frames being forwarded by the bridge). 
 Nat is mostly used for changing the mac addresses and contains three built-in 
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chains: PREROUTING (for altering frames as soon as they come 
in), OUTPUT (for altering locally generated or (b) routed frames before they 
are bridged) and POSTROUTING (for altering frames as they are about to go 
out). 
 Broute table has one built-in chain: BROUTING. The 
targets DROP and ACCEPT have a special meaning in the broute table. 
DROP actually means the frame has to be routed, while ACCEPT means the 
frame has to be bridged. The BROUTING chain is traversed very early. 
However, it is only traversed by frames entering on a bridge port that is in 
forwarding state. 
Now let's have a closer look on command line arguments [7], which will be used in 
this work. 
 -p, --protocol - The protocol which is responsible for creating frame. It can be 
hexadecimal number, above 0x0600, name (arp) or LENGHT. When the value of 
protocol field is below or equal 0x0600, the value equal the size of the header 
and shouldn't be used as protocol number. Readable names with 
corresponding hexadecimal numbers can be find under /etc/ethertypes. For 
example, 0x0800 will be represented by ipv4 (not case sensitive). 
 -i, --in-interface - The interface (bridge port) via which a frame is received. 
 --ip-source/--ip-destination - The source and destination ip addresses. 
 --ip-sorce-port/--ip-destination-port - The source port or port range for the 
IP protocols 6 (TCP), 17 (UDP) or 132 (SCTP). The --ip-protocol option must 
be specified as TCP, UDP, DCCP or SCTP.  
 --limit - Maximum average matching rate: specified as a number, with an 
optional /second, /minute, /hour, or /day suffix; the default is 3/hour. 
 --limit-burst - Maximum initial number of packets to match: this number gets 
recharged by one every time the limit specified above is not reached, up to this 
number; the default is 5. 
 --log-ip - Will log the ip information when a frame made by the ip protocol 







Netfilter iptables is a user-space command line utility to configure packet 
filtering rules [7]. It's the default firewall management utility on Linux systems.  
Iptables is used to set up, maintain, and inspect the tables of IPv4 packet filter 
rules in the Linux kernel. There are four tables filter, nat, mangle and raw. Each 
table contains a number of built-in chains and may also contain user-defined 
chains. Each chain is a list of rules which can match a set of packets. Each rule 
specifies target [7], meaning what action to do with a packet that matches.  
 Filter - default table. It contains the built-in chains INPUT (for packets destined 
to local sockets), FORWARD (for packets being routed through the box), and 
OUTPUT (for locally-generated packets) 
 Nat - table is consulted when a packet that creates a new connection is 
encountered. It consists of three built-ins: PREROUTING (for altering packets as 
soon as they come in), OUTPUT(for altering locally-generated packets before 
routing), and POSTROUTING (for altering packets as they are about to go out) 
 Mangle - table is used for specialized packet alteration. Since kernel 2.4.18, 
three other built-in chains are also supported: INPUT (for packets coming into 
the box itself), FORWARD (for altering packets being routed through the box), 
and POSTROUTING (for altering packets as they are about to go out), 
PREROUTING (for altering incoming packets before routing) and OUTPUT (for 
altering locally-generated packets before routing) 
 Raw - This table is used mainly for configuring exemptions from connection 
tracking in combination with the NOTRACK target. It registers at the netfilter 
hooks with higher priority and is thus called before ip_conntrack, or any other 
IP tables. It provides the following built-in chains: PREROUTING (for packets 
arriving via any network interface) OUTPUT (for packets generated by local 
processes). 
 
Now let's have a closer look on most widely used arguments[7], which were 
used in this work. 
 -p, --protocol - Protocol of the rule or of the packet to check. The specified 
protocol can be one of tcp, udp, udplite, icmp or the special keyword "all". Also 
it can be a numeric value, representing one of these protocols or a different 
one. A protocol name from /etc/protocols is also allowed. A "!" argument 
before the protocol inverts the test. "All" will match with all protocols and is 
taken as default when this option is omitted. 
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 -s, --source - Source specification. Address can be either a network name, a 
hostname, a network IP address (with /mask), or a plain IP address. Hostnames 
will be resolved once only, before the rule is submitted to the kernel. 
The mask can be either a network mask or a plain number, specifying the 
number of 1's at the left side of the network mask. A "!" argument before the 
address specification inverts the sense of the address. 
 -m, --match - Specifies a match to use, that is, an extension module which tests 
for a specific property. The set of matches make up the condition under which a 
target is invoked. Matches are evaluated first to last as specified on the 
command line and work in short-circuit fashion, i.e. if one extension yields 
false, evaluation will stop. 
 --src-range - Match source IP in the specified range. 
 --limit - Maximum average matching rate: specified as a number, with an 
optional `/second', `/minute' etc. 
 --limit-burst - Maximum initial number of packets to match: this number gets 
recharged by one every time the limit specified above is not reached, up to this 
number; the default is 5. 
 --destination-ports,--dports - Match if the destination port is one of the given 
ports. Multiple ports or port ranges are separated using a comma, and a port 
range is specified using a colon 
 -m recent --hitcount - This option must be used in conjunction with one of --
rcheck or --update. When used, this will narrow the match to only happen 
when the address is in the list and packets had been received greater than or 
equal to the given value. This option may be used along with --seconds to 
create a match requiring a certain number of hits within a specific time frame. 
The maximum value for the hitcount parameter is given by the "ip_pkt_list_tot" 
parameter of the xt_recent kernel module. Exceeding this value on the 
command line will cause the rule to be rejected. 
 --set - This will add the source address of the packet to the list. If the source 
address is already in the list, this will update the existing entry. This will always 
return success (or failure if ! is passed in). 
 --state - Where state is a comma separated list of the connection states to 
match. Only a subset of the states understood by "conntrack" are 
recognized: INVALID, ESTABLISHED, NEW, RELATED or UNTRACKED.  
  --syn - Only match TCP packets with the SYN bit set and the ACK,RST and FIN 
bits cleared. Such packets are used to request TCP connection initiation; for 
example, blocking such packets coming in an interface will prevent incoming 
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TCP connections, but outgoing TCP connections will be unaffected. It is 
equivalent to --tcp-flags SYN, RST, ACK, FIN SYN. 
 --destination-port,--dport - Destination port or port range specification.  
 
1.3 LINK AGGREGATION 
Link aggregation include various methods of combining multiple network 
connections in parallel in order to increase throughput beyond what a single 
connection could sustain, and to provide redundancy in case one of the links 
should fail [13]. A LAG (Link Aggregation Group) combines a number of physical 
ports together to make a single high-bandwidth data path, so as to implement the 
traffic load sharing among the member ports in the group and to enhance the 
connection reliability. Principle of link aggregation is shown in fig.1.4: 
 
Figure 1.4 Link aggregation 
 
Most important benefits from link aggregation: 
1. Multiple Connections With Little Speed Loss. 
Single file transfers or one-at-a-time transfers do not benefit much from link 
aggregation, but multiple connections and file transfers do. Some transfer 
rate increase might be apparent, but link aggregation perfectly works with 
multiple simultaneous transfers where several clients connect and 
download concurrently. Having more network lanes available allows all 
clients to encouter faster download speeds. Examples include a personal 
media server or network attached storage where multiple devices or users 
connect. 
2. Redundancy 
The physical links can be spread across multiple switches. If one switch fails 
or a cable is torn or disconnected, the transfer continues but at slower 
speeds until the issue is resolved. 
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3. Load Balancing 
This balances the network load across multiple network cards for more 
even performance and better throughput. Rather than making one card do 
most of the work, let the other cards distribute the workload among them. 
 
Linux bonding provides a method for aggregating multiple network interfaces 
(slaves) into a single logical bonded interface (bond). Linux supports two bonding 
methods[17]: 
 The IEEE 802.3ad link aggregation mode, which allows one or more links to 
be aggregated together to form a link aggregation group (LAG), such that a 
media access control (MAC) client can treat the link aggregation group as if 
it were a single link. 
 The balance-xor mode, where the bonding of slave interfaces are static and 







2.1 Experimental network 
All tests and measurements carried out on a specifically design and built 
network, equipped with network tester "Spirent Avalanche 3100B", which allows 
generating traffic by 1Gbit/s links. General view of network is shown on pic.2.1.  
 
 
Picture 2.1 - Testing network infrastructure 
Filter is presented in a form of three separated server machines which are 
connected in parallel. Same filtering tools will be used on all machines to compare 
hardware influence and link aggregation on filtering process. Hardware 







 Filter V1 Filter V2 Filter V3 
Aggregation 
Number of cores 4 16 2 
Clock 
speed(min/max) 
2800/3600 1600/2200 3400 
Network Interface 
Controller 







NIC drivers E1000 Ixgbe E1000 
Bus PCI-X( 66-MHz) PCIe(16) PCI-X 
 
Table 2.1 - Filters specifications 
PCI-X - 64-bit parallel computer bus with theoretical maximum of 1.06 GB/s 
data exchange speed between computer processor and peripherals.   
PCIe is a serial point-to-point connection bus with possible 4 GB/s bandwidth 
in each direction.  
Ixgbe - NIC driver with abilities to reduces the number of queues per 
interface-direction to the number of logical CPUs. The reasoning for this reduction 
is that each queue entails some overhead, and there is no advantage in maintaining 
more queues than there are CPUs 
As a filter machines software was used one of linux based distributions, 
Debian OS, as it is composed entirely of free software most of which is under GNU 
General Public License. 
  In order to have traffic passing through filtering server, first bridge needed to 
be configured. Configuration file for all interfaces is located at 
/etc/network/interfaces. There are 3 network interfaces on current filtering server. 
One is serving for VPN connection (remote control), other two services for 
carrying traffic. 
Needed bridge configuration for filter V1 should be as follows: 
# The primary network interface 
auto eth0 
iface eth0 inet static 
     address   12.12.13.26 
     netmask  255.255.0.0 





iface eth1 inet manual 
 
#auto eth3 




iface br0 inet static 
   bridge_ports eth1 eth3 
   address     192.168.2.120 
   broadcast  192.168.2.255 
   netmask    255.255.255.0 
   gateway    192.168.1.121 
 
Configuring Filter V2: 
auto eth1 
iface eth1 inet static 
address 147.229.7.213 
 netmask 255.255.255.248 
 gateway 147.229.7.209 
dns-nameservers 147.229.71.10 
#auto eth2 
iface eth2 inet manual 
 
#auto eth3 
iface eth3 inet manual 
 
auto br0 
iface br0 inet static 
 bridge_ports eth2 eth3 
 address 192.168.2.110 
 broadcast 192.168.2.255 
 netmask 255.255.255.0 
 gateway 192.168.2.111 
 
Filter V3 setup: 
source /etc/network/interfaces.d/* 
# The loopback network interface 
auto lo 




# The primary network interface 
auto enp3s1f0 
allow-hotplug enp3s1f0 
iface enp3s1f0 inet static 
  address 12.12.13.24 
  netmask 255.255.0.0 
  network 12.12.0.0 
  broadcast 12.12.255.255 
  gateway 12.12.12.254 
 
auto eth1 
iface eth1 inet static 
    address 192.168.2.117 
    netmask 255.255.255.0 
 
auto eth3 
iface eth3 inet static 
   address 192.168.2.116 
   netmask 255.255.255.0 
 
Bonding interface setup , as follows: 
 
Picture 2.2 - Links aggregation and interface bonding 
To be able to affect bridged frames, we needed to install ebtables tool and 
briedge-netfilter infrastructure. Also for tracking bandwidth and cpu utilization, 
tools such as "nload" and"htop" will be installed on all servers. 
#apt-get install bridge-utils 
#apt-get install ebtables  
#apt-get install htop 




2.2 Tunning  
In order to increased traffic throughput of NIC and linux kernel, we need to 
improve packet reception process and all filters. 
First check multiqueue mode and enable, if it's possible on receiving network 
devices: 
 
Picture 2.3 - Increasing number of rx_queues example 
Incoming frames on eth3 will be processed in 63 queues, which increase 
possible amount of filtering traffic. 
Increasing NIC ring buffers size: 
 
Table 2.4 Ring buffers size 
 Thus will help prevent network data drops at the NIC during periods, when 
large numbers of data frames are received. 
Enabling Receive Packet Steering: 
#echo 1 > /sys/class/net/eth3/queues/rx-0/rps_cpus 
Prevents the hardware queue of a single network interface card from 
becoming a bottleneck by creating hash from the IP addresses and port 
numbers, which it then uses to determine to which CPU to send the packet. 
The use of the hash ensures that packets for the same stream of data are sent 




To make testing consistent, we will start tests from layer 2 OSI model, 
meaning frames filtering with using only bridge code in linux and then go up to 
network layer with filtering packets. For all ddos types we will use ebtables rules 
to filter Ethernet frames and iptables rules to filter IP packets as they are well-
known and reliable.  
Legitimate traffic will be represented as 500 simulated users are sending "http 
get" request to web server port 80 each second for 3 minutes. The output of such 
request and working preconfigured bridge is shown on table.3.1, pic.3.3 and 3.2: 
Transactions    Time (ms)   TCP Connections 
 
Total 
 Rate Per  Page URL To TCP To First Est. Server  
Total   Second  Response Response SYN/ACK Data Byte Response  
      
            
Attempted 91879  491 Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.094 0.225 0.0 Attempted 91879 
            
Successful 86031 
 
460 Maximum 6017.0 6017.0 13999.418 6017.389 1996.095 Established 87494  
Unsuccessful 5848  31 Average 14.329 14.329 210.003 14.594 3.928   
Aborted 0  0         
            
Table 3.1 - User traffic  
 
Picture 3.1 - Response time for HTTP request 
First big spike corresponding to unsuccessful transactions tab which are 
related with Avalanche Commander specific functioning. Amount of traffic 





Picture 3.2 Legitimate traffic generation  
3.1 SYN Flood 
In this test Avalanche Commander is sending packets with SYN flags set from ip 
addresses range 192.168.2.163-192.168.2.167. By generating a big amount of SYN 
Flood packets along with legitimate traffic it able to increased server response 
time, which is shown on pic.3.3 and: 
 
Picture 3.3 - Legitimate traffic under SYN Flood 
Basically, there is no way to distinguish malicious packets trafic with SYN flag set on 
the Ethernet layer, so for filtering needed detections system which will provide us with 
malicious IP addresses: 
#ebatables -F 
#ebtables -N syn_flood 
#ebtables -A FORWARD -p ipv4 --ip-proto tcp --ip-dport 80 -j syn_flood 
#ebtables -A FORWARD -p ipv4 --ip-proto tcp --ip-dport 443 -j syn_flood 
#ebtables -A FORWARD -p ipv4 --ip-proto tcp -j DROP 
#ebtables -A syn_flood -p ipv4 --among-src-file data -j DROP 
#ebtables --atomic-file syn_flood -t filter --atomic-save 
In the file "data" we specified the range of MAC/IP addresses. To test applied rule 
we will generate maximum available SYN flood speed and see how much of it is 





Picture 3.4 SYN Flood Filtering by ebtables  
As we see only user traffic is passed through the server. There was no big 
additional CPU usage, corresponding to frame blocking. The maximum speed of 
incoming frames which kernel was able to filter is 170-180Mbit/s (~400000pps), 
including users and malicious traffic, which corresponds to maximum throughput 
of NIC. Another way to filter syn flood is limiting passing traffic based on packets/s, 
to decrease some load from target server. This solution is affecting user traffic also 
and is not preferable. 
By default, only ebtables code is able to process bridged frames, so to let iptables 
rules receive traffic from bridged ports, we need to enable bridgen-nf-call-iptables 
feature. 
To compare filtering with iptables rules based on ip addresses: 
#iptables –F 
#iptables –P FORWARD ACCEPT 
#iptables -N syn_flood 
#iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp –m tcp --syn  -j syn_flood 
#iptables -A syn_flood -m iprange --src-range 192.168.2.163- 
 162.168.2.167 -j DROP 
 




Picture 3.5 SYN Flood with Iptables filtering 
Although we are able to filter traffic on speed 90-100Mbit/s, the web server 
response time is still greatly increased due to CPU overloading, which is made by 
ksoftirqd - per-cpu kernel thread that runs when the machine is under heavy soft-
interrupt load. Increased response time and CPU utilization is shown on pic.3.7 and 
3.8:  
 
Picture 3.6 Response time under SYN flood 
 
Picture 3.7 CPU utilization 
Previously we disabled rpc_cpus feature to test cpu utilization. Now we 




Picture 3.8 – SYN flood with smp_affinnity 
Only 3 out of 4 cores are loaded with processing packets, which decreasing 
response time to acceptable range. However maximum amount of possible filtered 
traffic is increased from 90Mbit/s to 130Mbit/s. Assuming using more complex 
iptables rules with same user traffic will lead to denial of service.  
More complex rule with using conntrack tool inside linux kernel, as follows: 
#iptables -F 
#iptables -N syn_flood 
#iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -m state --state NEW -j syn_flood 
#iptables -A  syn_flood -m connlimit --connlimit-above 500 -j DROP  
Rule sets limit on amount connections per second coming from one ip address, 
assuming all 500 users will start simultaneously sending connection requests. The 
traffic filtering speed in this case is around 100Mbit/s with enabled load spread.  
Same tests were conducted on all filter servers and compared result are shown in 
tab.3.1: 
SYN Flood Mbit/s Filter V1 Filter V2 Filter V3 
Ebtables 182 178 174 
Iptables V1 130 177 102 
Iptables V2 100 184 83 
Table 3.1 - SYN Flood filtering 
As we can see, ebtables successfully allows filtering traffic on desired load. 
However, using ebtables can only be related with existence of any kind of detection 
system, which supplies filter with needed data. Using iptables rulse we are able to 
filter in more stand-alone way but it requires more hardware resources to use in 
order to filter same amount of traffic per second. Filter with aggregated links can 
benefit from having 1Gbps links instead of one, since the bottleneck is not in 
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filtering. More of that due to less computing resources it show  lower filtering 
throughput.  
 
3.2 UDP Flood 
UDP Flood testing in our network based on sending as much packets as possible on 
web server port 80 with spoofed source ip addresses. Main goal is to utilize all 
filter server CPU usage. Effect from generating UDP Flood can be seen on pic.3.9 
and pic.3.10:  
 
Picture 3.9 - Web server response time under UDP Flood 
 
Picture 3.10 - CPU utilization by UDP Flood 
On link layer to filter UDP flood we able to set following rules: 
#ebtbales - F 
#ebtables - N udp_flood 
#ebtables - P udp_flood DROP 
#ebtables - A FORWARD -p ipv4 --ip-proto udp  ! --ip-dport 53 -j udp_flood 
Udp packets which are destined to DNS server on port 53 will pass, all others udp 
packet should be dropped.  




Picture 3.11- Web server user load 
 
Picture 3.12 - Web server response time with filter 
As can be seen on WEB server traffic still struggling to pass through filter. All  4 
filter server cores are loaded with ksoftirqd program and filtering is possible but 
web server has still big response delay.  
To reduce cpu utilization on filter, it's possible to apply dropping packets even 
before they being processed by kernel. Among ebtables hooks there is nat table 
with PREROUTING chain which is logically located between kernel network stack 
and NIC. 
Applying same rules in table nat PREROUTING chain results in better 




Picture 3.13 - Filtering UDP with ebtables  
 
Picture 3.14 - User traffic response time 
Part of UDP Flood was decreased along with http response time. Although it 
stays in acceptable range under 1 second further countermeasures in network are 
required.  
Considering ebtables experience, iptables rules have to be applied on 
corresponding netfilter hook to have better result. So iptables table raw with 
PREROUTING chain should be configured as follows: 
#iptables - F 
#iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -p udp --dport 53 -d 192.168.2.145  -j  
ACCEPT 
#iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -p udp -d 192.168.2.145 -j DROP 
All passing udp packets going to web server should be dropped, except destined 
to DNS. 




Picture 3.15 - Response time under UDP Flood with iptables  
 
Picture 3.16 - Maximum udp traffic throughput  
How can be seen both ebtables and iptables are able to filter UDP flood attack. 
However, using iptables gives us litter bigger delay while communicating with web 
server. That is consequences of that  iptables uses more code to process each 
packet, so it need more calculating time. 
For the rest of servers same tests were conducted and result is combined in tab. 
3.2: 
UDP Flood(Mbit/s) Filter V1 Filter v2 Filter V3 
Ebtables  67 67 67 
Iptables 68 64 65 
 
Table 3.2 - UDP Flood filtering 
As this attack doesn't consume much resources, each server was able to 




3.3 ICMP Flood 
ICMP attack relies on constantly sending echo_request to force our web server 
to respond and consume additional resources.  
Generating attack along with sending user traffic also consumes, as shown on 
followed pic.3.17 and pic.3.28 show: 
 
Picture 3.17 - Web server load under ICMP Flood 
 
Picture 3.18 - HTTP traffic response time 
ICMP traffic is crucial for network control and it can't be dropped at all. Best 
way to filter on link layer is to set limit: 
#ebtables -F 
#ebtables -N icmp_flood 
#ebtables -A FORWARD -p ipv4 --ip-proto icmp -j icmp_flood 
#ebtables -A icmp_flood -p ipv4 --limit 2/s --limit-burst 10 -j ACCEPT 
#ebtables -A icmp_flood -j DROP 
As a standard icmp_echo request rate is 12 packet per 10 second, our limit is 




Picture 3.19 - ICMP Flood filtering using ebtables 
 
Picture 3.20 - CPU load under UDP filtering  
As can be seen there is no restriction from hardware on filtering side, but still 
there is a small delay related with packets processing. 
On network layer it's possible to deny any echo_request packets from outside of 
our network, since we want to leave troubleshooting options for network 
administrator.  
Needed rule as follows: 
#iptables -N icmp_flood 
#iptables -A FORWARD -p icmp -j icmp_flood 
#iptables -A icmp_flood -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -s 192.168.2.0/24 -j ACCEPT 
# iptables -A icmp_flood -j DROP 






Picture 3.21 - Response time under iptables filtering  
 
 
Picture 3.22 -  ICMP Flood filtering with iptables 
 
As expected all malicious ICMP traffic was filtered with adding a small delay to 
response time. 
The result for rest of the servers are described in tab.3.3: 
 Filter V1 Filter V2 Filter V3 
ebtables 68 70 69 
iptables 68 68 68 
Table 3.3 - ICMP Flood results 
A tiny part of computing resources is required for processing icmp flood, 





Main goal of master thesis, was to test appropriate tools for filtering traffic. 
Maximum achieved traffic throughput while filtering SYN Flood attack is 187 
Mbit/s, UDP Flood max. throughput is 67  Mbit/s and ICMP Flood was filtered in 
max. 71 Mbit/s.  
Considering received data, in this master thesis, it can be said that linux-based 
solution provide full scale of tools needed for filtering traffic. For example, SYN 
Flood ddos attack can be mitigated by using packet filtering with iptables without 
need of using any additional hardware or software. However, by installing 
additional detecting systems in network, better filtering performance can be 
achieved by using ebtables tool. The difference lies in packets flow inside the 
kernel network stack. UDP Flood ddos attacks can be mitigated using any available 
tool, but requirements for additional kernel tuning exists. Opportunity for links 
aggregation using linux software can be used in cases, where highly loaded 
network is being used. Additional speed can be achieved for user experience with 
using so called “bonding’.   
In real-time environment proposed ddos mitigation techniques should be 
consider as a temporarily measurements, due to limit resources capacity in 
provided systems. Recent average ddos rates in world are far beyond capabilities 
of any single filtering hardware or software. Thus to successfully filter malicious 
traffic is needed great cooperation among all parties, involved in global WEB work. 
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CPU        Central Processing Unit 
DDOS     Distributed Denial of Service 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol, protokol HTTP 
SYN        Synchronize sequence numbers 
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol, protokol ICMP 
RPS         Receive Packet steering. 
LAG        Link aggregation group 
MSS        Maximum segment size 
OSI         Open Systems Interconnection 
UDP        User Datagram Protocol 
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A  Ebtables rules 
 
##SYN Flood mitigation 
#ebatables -F 
#ebtables -N syn_flood 
#ebtables -A FORWARD -p ipv4 --ip-proto tcp --ip-dport 80 -j syn_flood 
#ebtables -A FORWARD -p ipv4 --ip-proto tcp --ip-dport 443 -j syn_flood 
#ebtables -A FORWARD -p ipv4 --ip-proto tcp -j DROP 
#ebtables -A syn_flood -p ipv4 --among-src-file data -j DROP 
##UDP Flood mitigation 
#ebtables - N udp_flood 
#ebtables - P udp_flood DROP 
#ebtables - A FORWARD -p ipv4 --ip-proto udp ! --ip-dport 53 -j udp_flood 
##ICMP Flood mitigation 
#ebtables -N icmp_flood 
#ebtables -A FORWARD -p ipv4 --ip-proto icmp -j icmp_flood 
#ebtables -A icmp_flood -p ipv4 --limit 2/s --limit-burst 10 -j ACCEPT 
#ebtables -A icmp_flood -j DROP 




B  Iptables rules 
 
##SYN Flood protection 
#iptables -F 
#iptables –P FORWARD ACCEPT 
#iptables -N syn_flood 
#iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -m tcp --syn -j syn_flood 
#iptables -A syn_flood -m iprange --src-range 192.168.2.163- 
 162.168.2.167 -j DROP 
##Connection limit 
#iptables -N syn_flood 
#iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -m state --state NEW -j syn_flood 
#iptables -A syn_flood -m connlimit --connlimit-above 500 -j DROP 
//UDP Flood protection 
#iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -p udp --dport 53 -d 192.168.2.145  -j  
ACCEPT 
#iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -p udp -d 192.168.2.145 -j DROP 
##ICMP Flood 
#iptables -N icmp_flood 
#iptables -A FORWARD -p icmp -j icmp_flood 
#iptables -A icmp_flood -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -s 192.168.2.0/24 -j 
ACCEPT 
# iptables -A icmp_flood -j DROP 
